Drug mules: Small rewards, enormous risks – why do people still take the bait?

The arrest of five Malaysians at Tokyo’s Haneda Airport on Oct 10, 2026, for allegedly attempting to smuggle about five kilogrammes of cocaine into Japan raises an important criminological question: why are people willing to risk their freedom, future and even their lives for relatively small payments to transport drugs for powerful criminal syndicates?

According to media reports, the five suspects, aged between 19 and 26, were allegedly offered RM8,000 each. The cocaine was reportedly worth about RM3.1 million. Malaysian police believe the suspects knew they were carrying drugs, although the culpability of each individual must be established through investigation and legal proceedings.

A separate case involving a Malaysian airline pilot arrested in Jakarta on suspicion of drug trafficking raises similar questions about the financial incentives and risks associated with such activities.

These cases highlight a persistent feature of transnational organised crime: the courier assumes enormous personal risks, while those controlling the operation stand to reap disproportionately greater financial rewards.

Drug mules cannot be explained simply by poverty or greed. Economic vulnerability is an important factor, but people from different financial backgrounds can also be attracted by the prospect of easy money.

For someone facing debt, unemployment, an unstable income or mounting financial commitments, RM8,000 may represent several months’ earnings. When legitimate opportunities appear limited, an overseas trip accompanied by the promise of an attractive payment can be difficult to resist.

From a criminological perspective, this reflects rational choice theory, under which individuals weigh perceived rewards against anticipated risks. However, this calculation can be distorted. Recruits may focus on the immediate payment while underestimating the likelihood of detection, the severity of punishment and the long-term consequences of a criminal conviction.

Others may be motivated by consumerism, lifestyle expectations, social status or a desire to improve their financial circumstances quickly.

Financial hardship may help explain vulnerability, but it does not automatically excuse deliberate participation in drug trafficking.

The disparity between the couriers’ alleged payment and the reported value of the drugs is striking. The RM8,000 reportedly offered to each courier in the Tokyo case is small compared with the cocaine’s estimated value of RM3.1 million.

The estimated value of seized drugs does not necessarily reflect a syndicate’s actual profit. Nevertheless, the comparison illustrates how couriers may receive only a fraction of the value of the consignment they transport.

Syndicates separate those who organise and finance their operations from those who physically carry the drugs. Organisers can remain distant from a shipment, while couriers become the most visible and immediately vulnerable participants.

If a consignment is intercepted, the courier faces arrest, prosecution and potentially lengthy imprisonment or even the death penalty, depending on the jurisdiction and applicable law. The organisers may lose a shipment but can attempt to recruit replacements.

In effect, couriers can become expendable components of a criminal enterprise. Those controlling the operation protect their financial interests by transferring much of the immediate legal risk to individuals offered comparatively small payments.

The prospect of the death penalty or lengthy imprisonment in some countries does not automatically deter people from becoming drug mules. Deterrence depends not only on the severity of punishment but also on whether potential offenders believe they are likely to be caught.

Some may convince themselves that airport checks are unlikely to detect the drugs. Others may regard the journey as routine, underestimate the sophistication of border controls or assume that those recruiting them would not expose them to serious danger.

This reflects optimistic bias – the tendency to believe that adverse consequences are more likely to happen to others than to oneself. Immediate financial rewards can also outweigh consideration of more distant consequences, particularly among people facing pressing financial difficulties.

An individual may recognise that trafficking is illegal but convince themselves that the payment justifies the risk.

The fundamental problem is that severe penalties may have limited deterrent effect when individuals underestimate the likelihood of detection or place disproportionate weight on immediate rewards.

The role of trust and personal relationships

Recruitment may also take place through friends, partners, acquaintances or wider social networks. Police reportedly believe that a Malaysian couple invited three friends to travel to Japan.

If established by the investigation, this would illustrate how personal trust can become a recruitment mechanism. An offer from a friend may appear more credible than one from a stranger, causing individuals to lower their guard.

However, the precise role of each suspect must be established through evidence. Investigators should examine who recruited whom, who supplied the drugs, who financed the journey and who was expected to receive the consignment.

The absence of a previous criminal record does not establish innocence or guilt. It simply means that no previous record has been identified; it does not determine whether an individual participated in the alleged offence.

Nor should all couriers automatically be regarded as either innocent victims or equally culpable offenders. Some knowingly participate for financial gain, while others may be deceived, coerced or exploited. These circumstances require individual assessment, with responsibility and punishment determined according to the evidence and applicable law.

From an organised crime perspective, arresting a courier may disrupt a shipment without dismantling the syndicate behind it. If the organisers, financiers, recruiters and suppliers remain untouched, replacements can be recruited to continue the operation.

Law enforcement must therefore investigate the wider criminal network, including its financial arrangements, sources of supply, recruitment relationships and international connections.

Cooperation between countries is essential because organisers, couriers and intended markets may be located in different jurisdictions.

Financial investigations should identify the beneficiaries of trafficking, trace illicit proceeds and pursue assets where legally justified. Success should not be measured solely by the number of arrests or the quantity of drugs seized, but also by whether those directing and financing the operations are brought to justice.

Prevention is equally important. Young adults need practical education about suspicious travel offers, requests to carry belongings for others and the potentially devastating consequences of accepting money to transport unknown or illegal items.

Employment opportunities, financial guidance and support for people facing economic difficulties may also reduce the appeal of easy-money offers.

Target the syndicates, not only the couriers

The Tokyo and Jakarta cases should prompt a broader examination of how drug syndicates recruit Malaysians and distribute the risks and rewards of trafficking.

Punishment remains an important component of deterrence, but it must be supported by credible detection, intelligence-sharing, financial investigations and efforts to dismantle recruitment networks.

Ultimately, the question is not merely why someone would risk imprisonment for RM8,000. It is why criminal enterprises can repeatedly persuade people to undertake such risks while retaining the greater share of the potential rewards.

A drug mule may carry the consignment but is not necessarily the person controlling the business. The real test of effective enforcement is whether authorities can identify and dismantle the syndicates that recruit couriers, finance shipments and profit from the trade.